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Chapter 2
WheN hUSBaNDS aND WIVeS 
DON’t aGree, WhO ‘WINS’? 
VaLUe/praCtICe DISSONaNCe 
IN the DIVISION OF WOrK 
arOUND pareNthOOD IN ItaLY
Manuela Naldini and Cristina Solera
ABSTRACT
During the transition to parenthood, gender allocation regarding time 
and commitment between work and family undergoes a profound redefi-
nition in response to both attitudes and the available resources. These 
attitudes may be concordant or discordant between two married partners, 
they may clash to a greater or lesser extent due to perceived financial 
or labour market constraints, and they may or may not provoke explicit 
conflicts and negotiations. In this study by combining quantitative and 
qualitative data, we focus on couples with young children or in transition 
to first child, and we explore what happens in the Italian case when part-
ners have discordant views on gender divisions of paid and unpaid work. 
The findings show that the division of domestic and care activities seems 
more resistant to change and more responsive to the husband’s attitudes 
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than does the division of paid work, as the latter is mainly driven by 
the woman’s education and attitudes. The findings also show that very 
few couples overtly disagree. If they do so, the main issue in dispute is 
the allocation of domestic work. Moreover, although women have the 
‘leading’ role in voicing and proposing solutions, these consist more in 
hiring external help than in obtaining the husband’s greater participa-
tion. Compared with domestic work, the allocation of care seems to be a 
less disputed and more flexible issue: when women start negotiations on a 
more equal sharing, men are more willing to increase their participation. 
However, when a more equitable sharing is not attained, couples’ narra-
tives more frequently cite constraints on the man (typically his work) 
than on the woman, and recount women’s rather than men’s redefinitions 
of preferences for the best of the family.
Keywords: Gender; childcare; housework; female employment; couple’s 
disagreement; parenthood
1. INTRODUCTION
Becoming parents for the first time changes the equilibrium between the 
couple to such an extent that, in a life-course perspective, the transition 
to parenthood is a crucial turning point (Fox, 2009; Grunow & everston, 
2016). During the transition to parenthood, the allocation of time and com-
mitment between work and family within the couple undergoes a profound 
redefinition. as is well known, such reorganization is gendered. although 
men’s involvement has increased, it is still mainly women who are consid-
ered responsible for the family and allocating time to daily household chores 
and care activities. Such allocation, however, is not independent – on the one 
hand – from women’s and men’s educational and occupational resources, 
which affect their time availabilities and earning bargaining powers or, on the 
other hand, from their views concerning what is best for the child, the ‘good’ 
mother and father, and appropriate gender roles. In couples, such normative 
views, as well as desires or preferences for specific allocations of paid and 
unpaid work, may be concordant or discordant; they may clash to a greater 
or lesser extent with perceived financial or labour market constraints; they 
may or may not provoke explicit conflicts; they may change over time with 
the ‘revolutionary’ experience of becoming a parent or during the negotiation 
process with the partner.
aQ1
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a large body of research has analysed the link between attitudes and 
behaviours, and between values and practices. however, it has typically done 
so at the individual level rather than the couple level. It has concentrated 
on the dissonance between own attitudes and own behaviour without con-
trolling for the partner’s attitude or without explicitly analysing what hap-
pens when partners have discordant or concordant attitudes. this chapter 
seeks to redress this shortcoming by combining quantitative and qualitative 
data. First, by drawing on the Italian National Institute of Statistics’ (IStat) 
‘Family and Social Subjects’ survey of 2003 – the only large-scale Italian 
survey including information on both partners and on both attitudes and 
behaviours – the chapter focusses on couples with pre-school children and 
explores the weight of his and her attitudes, controlling for their relative 
resources and time availabilities, in influencing the allocation of paid and 
unpaid work. In particular, it considers what happens between partners when 
the husband and wife have discordant attitudes: whether their actual allo-
cations correspond more to each of their attitude or more to each of their 
resources (so that his profile ‘wins’), and whether or not they show more 
explicit conflicts than couples with concordant attitudes. then, by drawing on 
a longitudinal qualitative study conducted in turin from 2010 to 2012 with 17 
dual-earner couples as part of an international project called ‘transparent’, 
we explore how men and women account for such allocations, whether they 
recount them as deriving from explicit discussion and negotiation and whether 
they consider the final allocation achieved as resulting more from constraints 
than preferences – more from his rather than her preferences or constraints.
2. WHEN HUSBANDS AND WIVES DO NOT AGREE: 
DIFFERENT THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
three strands of literature are relevant for addressing the link among atti-
tudes, agreements or disagreements and between partners and gender prac-
tices concerning parenthood.
Gender Division of Housework (or Labour)
the first strand comprises theories on the gender division of domestic work. 
these theories are usually categorized into three different perspectives 
labelled as ‘relative resources’, ‘time availability’ and ‘doing gender’. the first 
aQ2
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two – that of specialization (Becker, 1981) or that of bargaining and eco-
nomic dependency (Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Brines, 1994) – consider invest-
ments in the labour market to be crucial in determining the allocation of 
time between family and work. Indeed, it is a well-established finding in the 
literature that income gives more bargaining power and that the opportunity 
costs of devoting time to unpaid work are greater for those who have invested 
in the labour market and have jobs because they furnish prestige, responsibil-
ity, income and security. however, as various studies show, these theories are 
based on strong assumptions: couples are treated either as harmonious units 
that maximize the same utility function and decide solely on the basis of 
instrumental rationality or as conflictual units in which the two partners, man 
and woman, share the same ‘tastes’ and use their superior income to make 
the other do what they do not want to do. Various studies instead show that 
gender matters – that women, even when they have resources similar if  not 
superior to those of their male partner, do not have either the same ‘tastes’ 
or the same legitimation to invest in one or the other sphere. as Bittman, 
england, Folbre, Matheson, and Sayer (2003) and Kühhirt (2012) put it, 
‘gender trumps money’. the allocation of time between market and fam-
ily, in fact, has not only material but also symbolic implications involving 
individual and social definitions of what is required of a man and a woman. 
When children are born, these gender models intersect strongly with those 
concerning motherhood, fatherhood and what is the best for a child (Grunow 
& evertsson, 2016; Naldini, 2015). Moreover, according to the ‘doing gender 
approach’, these models change during the life course. they are influenced by 
the culture predominant in the country or in the social group of reference, but 
they are constructed in everyday discourses and practices in response to con-
straints and preferences, and instrumental and moral rationality (Duncan, 
2005; West & Zimmerman, 1987).
Preference Theory Revised
the emphasis on the role of culture is also present in hakim’s (1998, 2000) 
‘preference theory’ which challenges what the woman considers to be the 
dominant feminist view on women’s employment patterns and gender divi-
sion of labour: career breaks or part-time work, and these, hakim argues, are 
not choices forced on women against their will by their family responsibilities 
and the insufficient welfare provision of childcare services. rather, women’s 
disadvantaged and heterogeneous position in the labour market reflects the 
outcome of their differing family–work attitudes. as argued by Crompton 
aQ3
When Husbands and Wives Don’t Agree, Who ‘Wins’? 49
(2006), preference theory can be seen as belonging to sociological theories 
that emphasize individualization as the driving force behind change in late 
modernity (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Giddens, 1991). In line with the 
tenets of individuation theory, a body of evidence suggests that as women’s 
orientations towards investments in education and work have increased their 
choices concerning the life course have become more individualized and the 
‘partner effect’ has weakened. Yet, in contrast with both standard economic- 
and individuation-type hypotheses, which tend to neglect the role of contexts 
and posit a convergence between contexts, a large body of evidence shows 
that inequalities along classic ‘stratification’ lines, such as education and 
class, persist in different ways across countries. Cross-national convergence 
has not been achieved because institutional and cultural contexts constrain or 
enable choices, moderating micro-level mechanisms, including those of rela-
tive resources, time availability and gender ideology involved in work–family 
gender arrangements (Dotti Sani & Scherer, 2017; Steiber, Berghammer, & 
haas, 2016).
Cultural and institutional contexts provide different opportunities for 
preference attainment. For example, Crompton, Brockmann, and Lyonette 
(2005), on observing a relatively weak linkage among gender attitudes, wom-
en’s labour market participation and the gender division of domestic work, 
argue that this has mainly been due to a ‘structural’ rather than ‘cultural’ 
process. Women everywhere have become less traditional in their attitudes, 
and so too, albeit to a lesser extent, have men. however, as underlined by 
Gerson (1985), women’s ‘hard choices’ in deciding about work, career and 
motherhood ensue from a negotiated process, whereby they respond to often 
unanticipated constraints and opportunities encountered during their life 
courses. Yet, the allocation of domestic work in couples is still rather imbal-
anced, and its association with attitudes has weakened over time; the increase 
in work intensification plays a crucial role. this is consistent with the find-
ings of the research on the so-called ‘work–life conflict’ that the strain of 
reconciling work and family is strong not only among women but also among 
men, especially if  they have high-level jobs or are self-employed. Men increas-
ingly want to be involved fathers, but this seems to clash with the demands of 
their jobs and with the perception that they can only shed the image and the 
expectation of the ‘unconditional worker’ by incurring strong career penalties 
(McGinnity & Calvert, 2009; Musumeci & Solera, 2013).
Social policies and the organization of the labour market determine not 
only opportunities and constraints but also preferences. By favouring or 
not favouring some possible courses of actions, they also define normative 
models. Various studies have shown, in fact, that the relative contribution of aQ4
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men and fathers increases in the presence of ‘good’ policies such as a large 
provision of subsidized high-quality childcare services and fully paid paren-
tal leaves with a specific quota reserved for fathers (Fagan & Norman 2013; 
Musumeci & Solera, 2013; Smith & Williams 2007), but their success also 
depends on their specific configuration and on the discourse around them: 
if  family policies are framed in terms of supporting fertility, as in France, 
more than supporting gender equality, as in Scandinavian countries, the gen-
der division of labour is more traditional and the work–life stress is higher 
(Crompton, 2006; pfau-effinger, 2005).
this second strand of the literature, namely hakim’s preference theory 
and the debate on it – has produced very interesting research on the extent 
and correlates of attitude–practice assonance or dissonance. Yet, almost 
all such research has focussed on individual attitudes, disregarding that of 
the partner (Oláh & Gähler, 2014). Or when both partners’ attitudes have 
been included, the research has considered his and her attitudes separately 
(Mchale & Crouter, 1992; poortman & Van Der Lippe, 2009; Schober & 
Scott, 2012). What happens when husbands’ and wives’ have discordant views 
has been largely ignored, with the exception of some qualitative studies (e.g. 
Kompter, 1989).
Marital Power and Negotiation Processes
the focus of the conflict between married partners, including conflicting 
views, is present in studies on marital satisfaction and stability, the third 
strand of literature relevant to our research question. Coltrane (2000), 
for example, states that ‘‘the fit between husband’s and wife’s ideology is 
extremely important to marital satisfaction’’’ (p. 444); when partners share 
expectations on how household labour will be divided, they are more likely 
to act in a manner consistent with those expectations. Yet, couples often do 
not share expectations, with as many as one-third of couples disagreeing 
about who should be responsible for a particular aspect of family labour. 
this lack of shared expectations can cause deterioration in relationship qual-
ity and, in turn, union stability (hohmann-Mariott, 2006). however, how 
such discordant views are ‘resolved’ into the observed final division of labour 
is underexplored. an interesting framework to analyse this issue is provided 
by the ‘hidden power theory’, which maintains that the persistence of asym-
metry between husbands and wives in decision-making, division of domestic 
and care work, as well as control of finances is only modestly affected by 
women’s economic standing, time demands of each spouse, and both men’s 
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and women’s socialization and gender ideologies. this is because gender is 
a multidimensional and constitutive element of social structure (risman, 
2004; risman & Davis, 2013), and, as such, it is closely tied to distribution 
of power and resources. Yet, power is not only what bargaining theory and 
most theories assume: the ability to impose one’s will over the opposition of 
others. power takes many forms: it may be manifest power, latent power or 
invisible power (Kompter, 1989; Lukes, 1974). For instance, it may be latent 
by preventing some issues from arising, or it may work invisibly through the 
ways in which institutional and cultural arrangements shape individuals even 
without their awareness (Zipp, prohaska, & Bemiller, 2004).
Capturing power and negotiation process in general is very difficult, in both 
quantitative and qualitative terms. this is because it is not easy to measure 
marital power and because measurements should be repeated, which would 
require a time-sensitive approach like the ‘life-course’ approach (elder, 1995). 
Yet, by using a mixed method – that is, by looking at how couples, where only 
he or only she holds traditional attitudes, statistically differ in their actual 
divisions of paid and unpaid work from those where they have concordant 
attitudes, and then by reconstructing how men and women account for these 
divisions and the conflicts around them – we shall add some insights on hid-
den power and attitude/practice dissonance issues in the Italian context.
The Italian Context
In a comparative perspective, Italy is a country characterized by a still per-
sistent traditional division of housework and care (eurostat, 2008; Naldini 
& Jurado, 2013). Not surprisingly, in Italy the family is perceived, by both 
the general public and policy makers, as an inexhaustible resource for the 
‘weaker’ sections of the society (Naldini & Saraceno, 2008) with specific 
assumptions on gender and intergenerational relations. Cross-country atti-
tudinal data show that in Italy the share of the population supporting an 
equal involvement of women and men in the labour market (arpino, esping-
andersen, & pessin, 2015) and weak obligations between adult children and 
parents (Naldini, pavolini, & Solera, 2016) is still relatively low compared 
with that in most european countries. this persistent familialistic culture 
goes in tandem with a persisting mother-centred definition of what is best 
for the child (Bertolini, Musumeci, Naldini, & torrioni, 2016) and with insti-
tutional ‘familialism by default’ (Saraceno and Keck, 2010) which hampers 
the development of care services, especially for very young children, and 
the adoption of measures for the reconciliation of work with family life. In 
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spite of an important shift in reconciliation policies (Law 53/2000), Italian 
parental leave is paid at only 30% of the wage for a maximum of six months. 
Furthermore, ‘atypical workers’, an expression which mainly applies to men 
and women in the reproductive age group, are excluded from some meas-
ures that protect motherhood or support reconciliation, while the take-up 
rate of parental leave by fathers is still very low (Italian National Institute 
of Statistics [IStat], 2011; Koslowski, Blum, & Moss, 2016). at the same 
time, childcare services for children under three years of age in Italy are 
below the average level of the Organization for economic Cooperation and 
Development (OeCD) countries and the european Union. In 2012, the rate 
of children aged less than three years using a public childcare service was 
still 13.5% on a national level (IStat, 2014). reconciliation policy in Italy 
is also inadequate at the company level, where the flexibility of work sched-
ules, part-time work, and ‘family friendly’ measures are not widespread and/
or many employees are unable to take advantage of them (see Chapter 6 in 
this volume; Den Dulk, 2001; Fine-Davis, Fagnani, Giovannini, højgaard, & 
Clarke, 2004). thus, in Italy the dilemma of work versus family is still largely 
relegated to the private sphere, to the family and couple level, while the ten-
sions between change in women’s lives, especially regarding their participa-
tion in the labour market and resistant institutions, and the issues of gender 
imbalance are not addressed. It is within this scenario that this chapter will 
examine how couples with young children deal with the presence of discord-
ant views between partners.
3. ATTITUDES, DISPUTES AND PRACTICES: A 
QUANTITATIVE CROSS-SECTIONAL STUDY
Data and Variables
By using the data from the IStat ‘Family and Social Subjects’ survey of 
2003 and focussing on couples with young children (0–6 years old), we shall 
analyse whether and how in such couples divisions of paid and unpaid work 
respond more to the mother’s or father’s attitudes, or to attitudes of neither 
of them. although the IStat survey is relatively old, we chose it because it 
is the only large-scale Italian representative survey1 that contains informa-
tion on both partners not only in terms of education and labour market pro-
file but also in terms of attitudes. Moreover, it contains information on how 
often he and she disagree on a number of issues, including her labour market 
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participation and the division of domestic work. thus, indexes of sharing 
of unpaid and paid work could be ‘linked’ to different profiles of couples in 
terms of both his and her ‘preferences’ and ‘constraints’.
More precisely, the division of unpaid work was derived from a question 
asking each partner to declare: ‘In hours and minutes, how much time a week 
do you spend on domestic and family work (home chores, shopping, taking 
care of other members)?’. Summing the total of time declared by each part-
ner, it was possible to calculate her share of total unpaid work, which was used 
as a continuous dependent variable. the division of paid work was consid-
ered by looking at her labour market participation: whether or not the woman 
was employed at the time of the interview.
the independent variables selected were intended to capture the dimen-
sions that the theoretical debate has defined as significant. to grasp the rela-
tive resources of each member of the couple and their differing capacities 
for negotiation, we constructed an indicator of the couple’s educational pro-
file (with the following four categories: both are graduates, only the man is 
graduate, only the woman is graduate and neither of them is graduate) and, 
in the absence of information on income and wages, its occupational profile 
(measured as the combination of labour market positions of the man and the 
woman2). In order to grasp the time constraints on participation in unpaid 
work, we constructed an indicator of the couple’s participation in the labour 
market (whether or not the couple was a dual earner) and differences in terms 
of working hours. Finally, in order to consider gender orientations, we con-
structed couple profiles depending upon how each member responded to the 
following three statements: ‘housework lets a woman fulfill herself  just as 
much as paid work’; ‘if  the parents are separated/divorced, it is better for the 
child to remain with the mother’; and ‘when parents require care, it is natural 
for this to be provided by daughters rather than sons’. the responses to these 
statements were arranged on a 5-value Likert scale from strong agreement to 
strong disagreement. the respondent was defined ‘egalitarian’ if  the average 
of his/her responses to the above two statements was greater than 3; otherwise 
she/he was ‘traditional’. On the basis of this distinction, we defined couples 
as ‘consistent egalitarian’ when both members had egalitarian gender atti-
tudes; ‘consistent traditional’ when both members were traditional in their 
attitudes; and ‘mixed’ when only the woman or the man approved of non-
traditional gender roles. the IStat 2003 survey also contains information 
on how often women disagree with their partners on various issues, including 
whether or not she should work, and how domestic work should be divided. 
the possible answers were on a 4-value scale: often, sometimes, rarely and 
never. Dichotomising it (i.e. putting together ‘often’ with ‘sometimes’ and 
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contrasting it with ‘rarely’ and ‘never’), we built four categories of couple 
profiles: couples in which the partners often or sometimes argue about both 
issues; couples in which the partners argued only on her labour market par-
ticipation; couples in which the partners argued only on their division of 
domestic work; and couples in which the partners argued on neither of the 
two. Finally, to control different life-course phases and context opportunities, 
we introduced into the models also the age of the partners, number and age 
of children and the area of residence.
table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of all the variables used as covari-
ates in the regressions, and their bivariate association with our outcome vari-
ables, the division of paid and unpaid work. Given the well-known process of 
homogamy (Blossfeld & timm, 2003), the great majority of couples surveyed 
had very similar occupational and educational profiles: in 81% of couples 
neither the man nor the woman was tertiary educated. In 26% of couples, the 
partners had the same occupational class, a proportion which rose to 42% if  
only dual-earner couples were considered. partners seemed to match each 
other in terms of attitudes as well: 70% of couples were either both tradi-
tional or both egalitarian in their views on gender roles. Moreover, the great 
majority of couples with young children did not explicitly disagree on how 
paid and unpaid work should be allocated: 64% of them declared that they 
never or rarely argued about whether or not she should work and how domes-
tic work should be divided.
as the third and fourth columns in table 1 highlight, different profiles 
of couples seemed associated with different divisions of paid and unpaid 
work. In all couples with young children, women undertake the bulk of 
domestic and care work: on average, women’s share is 83%. however, higher 
shares are observed in couples where both partners approve of traditional 
gender norms, where neither of the partners is tertiary educated, where he 
has a higher occupational position and/or he is the only breadwinner. also, 
women’s participation in paid work is lower in specific types of couples: on 
average, only one in every two women with a young child of pre-school age 
is employed, but the proportion is even smaller in couples where both part-
ners have traditional attitudes and low education. Interestingly, more unequal 
divisions of unpaid work are observed in couples where the partners disagree 
on both her labour market participation and domestic work, or only on her 
labour market participation. Yet, the underlying ‘causal’ relationship may 
operate in the opposite direction: it is not disputes that lead to more unequal 
divisions, but more unequal divisions (or ones perceived as such) that induce 
women to disagree. Women in conflictual couples, in fact, record lower levels 
of satisfaction with divisions of domestic and care work: 40% of them declare 
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themselves little satisfied as opposed to 23% in couples that disagree only on 
her working status, and 12% in couples that do not disagree on the division 
of either paid or unpaid work.3
Correlates of Woman’s Share of Total Unpaid Work
although straightforward, these descriptive figures suffer from the usual 
‘bivariate limitation’. On moving from a bivariate to a multivariate 
Table 1. the profile of Our Couples: all Couples Whose Youngest Child 
Was 0–6 Years Old.
N % her Share of Unpaid 
Work (average)
Women  
employed (%)
his and her gender role attitudes
 Both egalitarian (consistent 
egalitarian couples)
741 33.8 80.1 63.4
 Only he is egalitarian 310 14.2 82.5 51.7
 Only she is egalitarian 325 14.8 83.0 60.6
 Both traditional (consistent 
traditional couples)
811 37.1 86.2 39.0
Disputes between him and her
 On both paid and domestic 
work
112 5.8 86.0 46.4
 Only on her paid work 129 6.7 85.8 31.0
 Only on their division of 
domestic work
458 23.7 83.5 64.1
 Neither of the two issues 1,237 63.9 83.3 48.4
his and her education
 Both have tertiary education 123 5.5 75.8 84.5
 Only he has a tertiary education 142 6.3 80.8 58.4
 Only she has a tertiary 
education
152 6.8 76.1 78.9
 Both without tertiary education 1,824 81.4 84.4 47.1
his and her occupational class
 the same class 587 26.2 78.5 82.8
 he is of higher class 1,299 58.0 86.8 25.1
 She is of higher class 355 15.8 77.3 100
his and her labour market status
 Dual earners 1,130 52.8 77.9 –
 Only he works 973 45.5 89.1 –
 Only she works 37 1.7 71.3 –
total 2,191 83.1 52.1
Source: Famiglia and Soggetti Sociali (2003). aQ5
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environment, it is possible to determine, ceteris paribus, whether the effect of 
the man’s or the woman’s attitudes and their degree of ‘conflict’ persists after 
controlling for their relative resources and time availability, as maintained by 
‘doing gender’ scholars, and whether his attitudes are more influential than 
hers, as argued by the ‘hidden power’ theory. this issue is analysed in tables 
2 and 3, where five models gradually including different types of variables 
are reported: In table 2, the outcome variable is a continuous variable (i.e. 
the woman’s share of total unpaid work); in table 3, it is a discrete variable 
(i.e. woman’s employment status). More precisely, model 1 includes as covari-
ates only couple’s profile in terms of attitudes; model 2 adds the variable on 
the frequency of disputes between partners; model 3 adds measures of rela-
tive resources (couple’s profile in terms of educational level and occupational 
class); model 4 adds a measure of time availability (differences in terms of 
working hours); and model 5 combines all the covariates.
Model 1 in table 2, where only attitudes are presented, shows that ‘con-
sistent traditional couples’ have also the most traditional behaviours in the 
division of unpaid work, followed by couples where at least one partner has 
traditional views, regardless of whether it is female or male. however, when 
measures of relative resources or time availability are introduced (models 
3–5), his attitudes seem to ‘win’. When he has egalitarian views, divisions are 
also more egalitarian, regardless of her views: levels of  sharing are indeed 
not statistically different between couples where both he and she are egalitar-
ian (‘egalitarian consistent couples’) or only he is egalitarian; likewise, levels 
of  sharing do not statistically differ in couples where both are traditional 
(‘traditionally consistent couples’) or only the male is traditional. however, 
on controlling for attitudes and labour market positions, the strongest effect 
is given by education with no ‘winner’ between male and female: in couples 
where both he and she are not tertiary educated, her share of unpaid work 
increases by six percentage points compared with couples where at least 
one partner is tertiary educated. the effect for attitudes was half  as strong, 
around three percentage points. put differently, high education, regardless 
of whether it is held only by male, female or both partners, engenders less 
traditional gender divisions.
Correlates of Woman’s Employment and Couple’s Disputes
table 3 estimates the effects on the probability of women with pre-school 
children being employed, and it shows different models with the gradual 
addition of relevant covariates as done in table 2, except for models 4 and 5, 
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Table 2. effects on Women’s Share of total Unpaid Work (Couples with 
Youngest Child aged 0–6 Years; Linear regression Coefficients).
M1:  
attitudes
M2:  
attitudes + 
Disputes
M3:  
attitudes 
+ Disputes 
+ relative 
resources
M4:  
attitudes + 
Disputes  
+ time  
availability
M5: attitudes +  
Disputes + 
relative  
resources + 
time availability
His and her gender role attitudes (ref.: both egalitarian)
 Only he is egalitarian 2.06* 1.49 0.67 1.04 0.76
 Only she is egalitarian 2.66** 3.15** 3.02** 2.96** 2.61**
 Both traditional 4.78*** 4.74*** 3.50*** 3.65*** 3.23***
Disputes between him and her (ref: both on paid work and domestic work)
 Only on her paid work –1.14 –1.60 –2.70 –2.98†
 Only on division of 
domestic work
–1.38 –0.52 –0.83 –0.88
 Neither of the two –2.00 –1.84 –2.50† –2.67†
His and her relative resources
education (ref.: both tertiary education)
 Only he has tertiary 
education
2.82 3.10†
 Only she has tertiary 
education
2.80 1.45
 Both without tertiary 
education
6.97*** 6.01***
Occupational class (ref.: the same class)
 he is of higher class 5.74*** 0.21
 She is of higher class –2.14* –1.69†
His and her time availability
Labour market status (ref.: dual earner)
 One earner 2.26** 1.30
 Working hours 
difference: his minus her
0.19*** 0.18***
Control variables
 his age 0.02 –0.04 –0.06 –0.09 0.00
 her age –0.30*** –0.22* –0.07 –0.01 –0.03
 Number of children 2.08*** 1.88*** 1.36** 1.16** 1.03**
age of the youngest child (ref.: 0–3)
 3–6 2.73*** 2.41*** 2.21*** 2.07** 1.87**
area (ref.: North)
 Centre 1.83* 1.25 0.87 1.19 1.31
 South 5.60*** 5.30*** 4.43*** 4.43*** 4.49***
Constant 82.27*** 85.16*** 73.05*** 76.54*** 70.05***
R2 0.059 0.058 0.10 0.13 0.14
N 2,149 1,865 1,865 1,865 1,865
Source: Famiglia and Soggetti Sociali (2003).
Notes: †p < 0.20, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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since in this case time availability (measured as time free from labour market 
commitment) becomes part of the dependent variable. the results in table 3 
show a slightly different picture for participation in paid work compared with 
unpaid work, the former being driven more by her than his attitudes. It indeed 
emerges that ‘consistent egalitarian couples’, that is, couples where both hold 
Table 3. effects on Women’s probability of Being employed (Couples with 
Youngest Child aged 0–6 Years; Logit regression Coefficients).
M1: attitudes M2: attitudes + 
Disputes
M3: attitudes + 
Disputes + relative 
resources
His and her gender-role attitudes (ref.: both egalitarian)
 Only he is egalitarian –0.42*** –0.35** –0.16
 Only she is egalitarian –0.07 –0.08 –0.28
 Both traditional –0.81*** –0.77*** –0.64***
Disputes between him and her(ref.: both on paid work and domestic work)
 Only on her paid work −0.46† −0.55†
 Only on division of 
domestic work
0.63*** 0.44†
 Neither of the two 0.03 −0.12
His and her relative resources
education (ref.: both tertiary education)
 Only he has tertiary 
education
–0.68*
 Only she has tertiary 
education
–0.71†
 Both without tertiary 
education
–1.68***
Occupational class (ref.: the same class )
 he is of higher class –3.01***
 She is of higher class –
Control variables
 his age –0.01 –0.01 0.01
 her age 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.07***
 Number of children –0.52*** –0.47*** –0.53***
age of the youngest child (ref.: 0–3)
 3–6 –0.20** –0.20** –0.31**
area (ref.: North)
 Centre –0.44*** –0.48*** –0.39**
 South –1.15*** –1.13*** –1.35***
Constant –0.89** –1.18*** 2.27***
Log-likelihood 374.21 347.67 789.84
N 2,187 1,895 1,602
Source: Famiglia and Soggetti Sociali (2003).
Notes: †p < 0.20, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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egalitarian gender role attitudes, have, ceteris paribus, the same probability of 
being employed as couples where she is the only egalitarian, while the prob-
ability decreases when she is traditional and he is egalitarian, reaching the 
minimum level when they are both traditional. as regards the division of 
unpaid work, education proves to be the strongest correlate. Yet, unlike for 
unpaid work, participation in paid work is driven mainly by her level of edu-
cation: when she is not tertiary educated, her probability of being employed 
is lower, regardless of his level of education. Moreover, while for the divi-
sion of domestic and care work, disagreements between partners seem not to 
matter for the division of paid work they do so: couples who often explicitly 
disagree on the allocation of domestic work have higher female employment 
rates than non-conflicting couples. Yet, again the causal link behind this asso-
ciation may be the reverse: employed women tend to be less satisfied with the 
actual allocation of unpaid work, feeling the double burden to be excessive, 
so they tend to ‘voice’ and have explicit disputes with their partner.
table 4 gives further insight into the conflict issue. By running logit regres-
sions on couples’ probability of disagreement (with the covariate in table 2: 
‘Discussions between he and she’ transformed into a binary dependent vari-
able: ‘neither of the two’ vs. the rest) and by showing four models in place 
of five (model 2 as in table 2 could not logically be run because disputes 
here become the dependent variable), one can see what profile the conflict-
ing couples are more likely to have. Very few factors seem to influence cou-
ples’ disagreements. Couples with discordant attitudes tend to disagree more 
than concordant couples, but only when she is egalitarian and he is tradi-
tional, whereas when she is traditional and he is egalitarian, disagreement 
is not expressed. her characteristics also seem to weigh more (she ‘wins’) in 
case dissonance regards occupational position: when she has a higher occu-
pational position, couples disagree more. Yet, if  one looks at education, his 
education has a stronger effect on couples’ tendency to disagree (he ‘wins’): 
when couples are not homogamous, and he is the only tertiary educated part-
ner, they disagree more, whereas when she is the only highly educated partner 
there is no difference with respect to homogamous couples with either low or 
high education. this might signal innovative men who push more traditional 
wives towards new gender practices.
although interesting, these cross-sectional quantitative analyses suf-
fer from endogeneity problems. attitudes, disagreements, behaviours and 
resources, including education and labour market positions, are measured 
at the same point in time, that is, at the time of the interview. Moreover, 
while showing the diffusion of more or less egalitarian divisions and their 
associations with different types of couples in terms of both preferences 
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and constraints, they furnish no information on the processes and meanings 
behind them. the longitudinal qualitative interviews conducted with first-
time parents will complete the picture, helping to shed light on whether and 
how partners negotiate the allocation of paid and unpaid work during the 
transition to parenthood, what are the most disputed issues between them, 
Table 4. effects on Couple’s probability of Disputes over her Labour 
Market participation and their Division of Domestic Work (Couples with 
the Youngest Child aged 0–6 Years; Logit regression Coefficients).
M1:  
attitudes
M3:  
attitudes +  
relative  
resources
M4:  
attitudes +  
time  
availability
M5: attitudes + 
relative  
resources + 
time availability
His and her gender role attitudes (ref.: both egalitarian)
 Only he is egalitarian –0.01 –0.01 –0.01 –0.01
 Only she is egalitarian 0.26* 0.28** 0.27* 0.29**
 Both traditional 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.07
His and her relative resources
education (ref.: both tertiary education)
 Only he 0.52* 0.52*
 Only she 0.32 0.25
 Neither 0.07 0.13
Occupational class (ref.: the same position)
 he is of higher class 0.01 0.19†
 She is of higher class 0.36** 0.34**
His and her time availability
Labour market status (ref.: dual earner)
 One earner –0.19† –0.20†
 Working hours 
difference: he vs. she
–0.00
Control variables
 his age –0.01 –0.01 –0.00 –0.01
 her age 0.01 –0.00 –0.00 –0.01
 Number of children –0.05 –0.04 –0.03 –0.02
age of the youngest child (ref.: 0–3)
 3–6 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06
area (ref.: North)
 Centre –0.03 –0.02 –0.01 –0.02
 South –0.02 0.00 0.03 0.04
Constant –0.08 –0.13 0.14 –0.05
Log-likelihood 7.28 19.7 14.9 25.2
N 1,895 1,895 1,895 1,895
Source: Famiglia and Soggetti Sociali (2003).
Notes: †p < 0.20, *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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what motivations they give for the final division achieved, especially when it is 
not consistent with own attitudes/preferences or pre-childbirth expectations.
4. HOW PARTNERS NEGOTIATE DISAGREEMENTS 
DURING TRANSITION TO PARENTHOOD: A 
QUALITATIVE LONGITUDINAL STUDY
Data and Codes
as mentioned in the Introduction, to explore negotiation and disagreement 
during the transition to parenthood, we used a longitudinal qualitative study 
based on 68 in-depth interviews conducted in turin from 2010 to 2012 with 
17 dual-earner couples, aged 26–45 years (mostly aged 30–39 years) in the 
process of becoming first-time mothers and fathers. the aim of the three-
waves longitudinal design (pre-pregnancy period, which was reconstructed 
retrospectively in the course of antenatal interview, pregnancy and finally 
when the child was about one-and-a-half-year old) was to see whether these 
couples relatively egalitarian in both behaviours and attitudes remained as 
such after becoming parents.4 More precisely, by selecting couples through 
contacts and formal requests for collaboration with institutions, structures 
and foundations of the turin area (birth centres, counselling services, cen-
tres of midwives and gynaecologists), we interviewed men and women sep-
arately and together at two points in time (before and after childbirth). In 
order to capture potentially innovative practices and accounts, we mainly 
selected highly educated men and women. Consequently, the majority of 
subjects were employed in the service sector as teachers, researchers, admin-
istrators, social workers, nurses, technicians and lawyers. however, most jobs 
were unstable in terms of financial and social security: only 5 of 17 couples 
were in ‘Fordist employment’, that is, had full-time permanent jobs; the 
rest were couples experiencing a mixture of standard and ‘non-standard’ 
employment or non-standard and self-employment.
In line with the results of quantitative analyses, the degree of homog-
amy was also quite high in our dual-earner couples, where female and male 
respondents showed fairly similar education and employment positions. 
Nevertheless, only in 3 out of 17 couples did the woman earn more than her 
male partner, the average monthly income in case of women being around 
€1,200 and that of men around €1,700. Yet, both for men and women the 
range of variation was high, ranging from a minimum of €600 to a maximum 
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of €2,000 monthly for women and from €1,200 to 2,500 monthly for men. a 
lower degree of homogamy was observed in individual attitudes. In fact, while 
almost all men were work oriented and very worried about finding themselves 
in a precarious or unstable work situation, women formed a more heteroge-
neous group. Most of the expectant mothers described work as a source of 
satisfaction and sometimes of self-gratification, although two other ‘types’ of 
women also emerged: those who did not consider work to be a priority, being 
in a position to reduce or leave work (maybe temporarily) after childbirth; 
and others who appeared to have ambivalent attitudes towards their job, as a 
consequence of a redefinition of their priorities vis-à-vis their new condition 
as a mother-to-be.
the quantitative analyses reported in the previous section showed that edu-
cational and occupational homogamous couples, and thus with more sym-
metric time availabilities and bargaining powers, tend to have more egalitarian 
divisions than non-homogamous couples. this is in line with the (pre-child-
birth) share in our interviewed couples, in which the prevailing pattern was 
‘egalitarian’ (7 out of 17 couples), where partners shared housework equally 
and/or had a subjective perception of ‘fair’ share. In these couples both part-
ners had similar preferences on how unpaid work should be divided and how 
woman’s commitment to paid work should take place. Besides the ‘egalitarian’ 
group of couples who shared both unpaid and paid work equally and had 
egalitarian attitudes, there was an intermediate (and in transition) group that 
we label as ‘neo-traditional’ (6 out of 17 couples) who exhibited certain fea-
tures next to egalitarian couples in terms of both attitudes and behaviours, but 
with some important differences, because women had a lower commitment 
than their partner vis-à-vis their job and/or their attitudes were not aligned. 
Lastly, we found a small group of couples (4 out of 17 couples) that we term 
‘traditional’ because they showed a high gender division of roles in housework 
and labour market, as well as both (consistent) traditional attitudes.5
In order to analyse the interviews, the corpus of the texts was subjected 
to content analysis (Smith, 2000) using the atlas.ti7 software, and inter-
subjectivity was created within a multidisciplinary research group and main 
relevant issues were identified by using disposal codes (Naldini, 2015). With 
regard to the driving questions of this chapter, although conflicts were not 
explicitly explored with the interview, the collection of data and narratives 
on the negotiation processes around parenthood made it possible to explore 
this aspect indirectly. In particular, for the purpose of this chapter, we used 
the quotations for code ‘agreement/disagreement’ (264 quotations found 
for the queries) and merged this code with the code ‘satisfaction/dissatisfaction’. 
the emerged content analysis is described as follows.
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to start with, in line with the general picture yielded by the quantitative 
analysis, disagreement is very rarely apparent in couples’ interviews before 
and after childbirth. Couples’ narratives, in fact, very rarely speak about 
either overt quarrels or ‘pacific’ discussions, pointing to explicit negotiation 
processes. Instead, the recurrent narrative is that there are no conflicts on 
the division of labour and that the final allocation of work in the couple has 
been reached ‘spontaneously’, without disagreements: ‘We got it naturally’; 
‘there is no need to plan those allocations’. Yet, deeper analysis using the code 
‘agreement/disagreement’ revealed some areas and forms of dispute.
The Allocation of Domestic Labour
as found by the quantitative study, the qualitative analysis showed that even 
though there were substantial differences, the allocation of domestic work 
tended to be the most disputed issue, regardless of the type of couple. Indeed, 
divergences in the allocation of domestic labour were found among egalitar-
ian-oriented couples, as well as among neo-traditional and traditional cou-
ples. Ginevra and Giuseppe,6 for instance, were an egalitarian couple in terms 
of both attitudes and behaviours. they both had a university degree, and at 
the time of the first interview he was working (on a fixed-term contract) for 
a company providing information on financial markets, while she was work-
ing as an aeronautical engineer with an open-ended contract (thus, she had 
more relative resources than him). they were a very work-oriented couple, for 
different reasons: Giuseppe wanted to consolidate his professional position 
(which was still precarious); Ginevra wanted to pursue a career and capitalize 
on her many years of university study. they expressed some disagreement on 
the allocation of domestic work during both the first and the second interview:
housework is one of those things on which we repeatedly argue […] that is: we divide the 
chores fifty/fifty but then this becomes fifty-one for me, then fifty-two, then fifty-three, 
then fifty-four and when it reaches ninety per cent, we have a row and start all over again, 
from the beginning. (Ginevra , aeronautical engineer, II wave)
La cura domestica è una di quelle cose sulla quale ripetutamente, ciclicamente litighiamo 
[…] ovvero: ci dividiamo i compiti al 50% poi questo 50% diventa 51 per me, 52 per me, 
53 per me, 54 e quando arriva al 90% scatta il litigio e si ricomincia da capo, da capo, da 
capo. (Ginevra, aeronautical engineer, II wave)
Ginevra’s story of transition to parenthood is interesting because it high-
lights what happens when the female partner has more resources, as well 
as more agencies, than her male partner. however, it is not only her higher 
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resources that allow the couple to activate negotiation processes but more 
widely her egalitarian gender expectations.
Domestic work may be a disputed issue not only for egalitarian couples, as 
seen in the above case of Ginevra and Giuseppe, but also for less gendered-
oriented couples. For instance, we found disagreement on domestic work 
in neo-traditional couples. Neo-traditional couples are defined as those in 
whom we found a dissonance or not perfect alignment between his and her 
attitudes or behaviours. In some ways, in neo-traditional couples, negotia-
tion processes tended to be quite frequent and cited more overtly in couple’s 
narratives with regard to not only domestic work but also other household 
issues, and/or expectations about gender roles. this is rather well exemplified 
by raniero and rachele. rachele (the mother-to-be) was a temporary full-
time researcher at the University of turin, while raniero was employed in an 
open-ended contract as a full-time mechanical designer at a company which 
at the time of the interview was hit by economic crisis and obliged raniero 
to remain for a while at home. although they agreed that domestic work 
should be equally divided, they had divergent views on the level of cleaning 
and orderliness in their home. raniero did not deny that sometimes there 
were arguments because he believed he was doing more than her, especially 
during the first phase of their cohabiting period because of rachele’s extra 
time devoted to work (and study). he admitted that at the beginning of their 
ménage he agreed with such division, but he later started to feel dissatisfied 
with being the main organizer of the household work. Before they got mar-
ried, raniero indeed expected rachele to be more of a ‘home-maker’ (and 
rachele was aware of this expectation):
Maybe it was an illusion because I knew what she was like. But this is what I expected. 
really, she is less a homemaker than, I don’t know, my mother …. truly there is an abyss. 
(raniero, mechanical designer, I wave)
Forse un po’ illudendomi perché un po’ la conoscevo, però forse avevo quest’aspettativa 
qui. In realtà, lei è un po’ meno casalinga, che ne so, rispetto a mia madre … proprio c’è 
un abisso. (raniero, mechanical designer, I wave)
On the other hand, rachele thought that orderliness in their home was not 
crucial for her and their life:
No, (laughs) sometimes we fight because he is too homely. No, this doesn’t at all reflect 
what I was expecting, that is, in my opinion sometimes, perhaps it depends on his mental-
ity, he gives too much importance to housework: for me if  you go to bed with dirty dishes 
in the sink nothing happens, for him it is something inconceivable about which we end up 
fighting. (rachele, temporary researcher, II wave)
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No (ride) certe volte litighiamo perché lui è troppo casalingo. No, non rispecchia assolu-
tamente quello che mi aspettavo; cioè, secondo me, a volte, magari dalla mia mentalità, 
lui dà troppa importanza ai lavori casalinghi: per me se vai a dormire con i piatti sporchi 
nel lavandino non succede niente, per lui invece è una cosa inconcepibile per cui alla fine 
cozziamo su queste cose qua. (rachele, temporary researcher, II wave)
Indeed, a good solution for raniero would be for rachele to switch to 
part-time work after the baby’s arrival. this case shows that divergent prefer-
ences between the partners may generate other disputed issues (i.e. working 
time) and this underlines how disagreement and tensions within a couple may 
lead to wearisome negotiation processes.
allocation of unpaid work was the main (manifest) reason of disagree-
ment among the different couples. For example, tiziana and tommaso were 
a traditional couple in terms of division of domestic work and orientation to 
work. tiziana had already said during the first interview that, because of the 
hard work of her husband, a lawyer, she had to do almost all the domestic 
work.
I do everything, we don’t have a cleaning lady; For now I’ll do it when I get my belly I 
think … my mom told me he was helping me or he helped me (laughs). I do everything. I 
do everything. (tiziana, secretary, I wave)
Faccio tutto io, non abbiamo una signora delle pulizie; per adesso ce la faccio quando poi 
avrò la pancia penso che … mia mamma mi ha già detto che mi aiuta oppure mi aiuta lui 
(ride). Faccio tutto io. Faccio tutto io. (tiziana, secretary, I wave).
tommaso, who, during the first interview, admitted that he did ‘less than five 
per cent’, however, pointed out that the reason was not bad will but lack of time, 
and that there was a task carried out only by him: washing dishes: ‘washing 
dishes has always been my kingdom’ (tommaso, lawyer, II wave). at the time of 
the second interview, tommaso was still overwhelmed by work and expressed 
dissatisfaction with this situation: he would like to reduce his work commitment 
and return home early in the evening. Meanwhile, tiziana had hired a woman 
to help her with ‘heavier jobs’. Use of external help was her strategy to bring 
changes in the case of overload on her shoulders or disagreement on the alloca-
tion of domestic work. this ‘externalisation’ appears to be a common strategy, 
being declared by many other couples. For example, in Luana’s words:
“we’ve decided that to quarrel over the weekend is not nice […] now we quarrel less and 
we love each other more, since we have more time to do things together. (Luana, admin-
istrative employee, I wave)
abbiamo deciso che litigare nei weekend non era bello così litighiamo meno e ci ami-
amo di più e abbiam più tempo per fare le cose che vogliamo fare insieme, perché senno 
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appunto, il tempo che passiamo insieme passarlo a pulire casa non è bello. (Luana, 
administrative employee, I wave)
also, rachele and raniero in the second wave adopted this strategy: hir-
ing a cleaning woman for some hours during the week in order to have fewer 
disputes. Yet, this did not prevent rachele from feeling guilty at not respond-
ing to gender expectations, and she felt that she should devote more time to 
housework and to family life, while in raniero’s opinion, the ideal solution 
would be for her to go for part-time work.
however, in general, bringing about a change in this area is not a powerless 
process, and it requires a great deal of negotiation and also some emotional 
work (hochschild, 1979). this is well exemplified by Gina and Giulio. they 
were a traditional couple in terms of attitudes and division of domestic work. 
he was a freelancer, working in the It sector, while Gina was a social worker 
with a very fulfilling job. In the first wave, they displayed quite ‘traditional’ 
attitudes and a clear gender division of housework. Yet, in different parts 
of Gina’s narrative, there emerged divergences on the division of domestic 
labour and the changes she was making in order to have somebody to help 
her with domestic work.
[…] at first […] my husband was not too supportive of an external person to clean the 
house because he was not used to it, had never considered the thing, it was not something 
he had ever had in his family. So he disagreed. I think he had in mind, when we had to 
think about our life together, that we would have done things together and shared them. 
But this didn’t really happen, because then, despite good will, he with his work couldn’t 
do it, and when he did it I wasn’t satisfied, I have to admit it, because he didn’t do it as 
it should have been done because he didn’t have the experience, etcetera. (Gina, social 
worker, I wave)
[…] all’inizio […] mio marito non era troppo favorevole all’intervento di una persona 
esterna perché non era abituato, non aveva mai preso in considerazione la cosa, non era 
una cosa che aveva mai avuto nella sua famiglia quindi non era d’accordo. Io credo che lui 
avesse in mente, quando dovevamo pensare alla nostra vita in comune, che avremmo fatto 
le cose insieme e le avremmo condivise poi in realtà questa cosa non si è tanto realizzata 
perché comunque poi lui, al di là della buona volontà, col lavoro comunque non riusciva 
a farlo, quando lo faceva io non ero soddisfatta, devo ammetterlo, perché comunque 
non lo faceva come avrebbe dovuto essere fatto perché non aveva l’esperienza ecc. (Gina, 
assistente sociale, I wave)
Gina’s words illustrate not only the process of negotiation but also the 
emotional work that she had to perform to align her gender ideology of par-
ity (hochschild & Machung, 1989), partially shared by her husband, with the 
reality: her husband did not (or could not) share domestic work and she had 
too high standards (female) of expectations about cleanliness.
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So there were continuous tensions. then I insisted a lot and I arranged to get this help. 
Now it seems to me that he’s happy and that he understands the meaning. (Gina, social 
worker, II wave)
Quindi c’erano continue tensioni. allora lì io ho insistito tantissimo e mi sono impuntata 
per avere questo aiuto. adesso mi sembra che ne sia contento anche lui e che ne capisca di 
più il senso. (Gina, assistente sociale, II wave)
With the use of external help, Gina tried to find an answer to why, despite 
the tacit arrangements of a more ‘equal’ allocation of housework, the divi-
sion was in practice very distant from it. During the second interview, there 
was a turning point, since Giulio unexpectedly decided to reduce his work-
load to take care of the baby. this innovative gender practice was recounted 
by the couple because of more constraints than choices. an adaptation strat-
egy was necessary as Gina’s employer refused to accept her request to shift 
to part-time. her preferences, strongly focussed on the idea that it would be 
good for the child in the early years of life to remain with the mother (or the 
parents), clashed with job demands so that the couple had to rely on his time 
availability for care. this is one of the rare cases of ‘undoing gender’ in the 
Italian context (Musumeci et al., 2015). also in this case, similar to the ones 
mentioned above, the gender strategy adopted to achieve a more equal divi-
sion of domestic work was to hire a cleaning woman, a strategy which seemed 
to make both partners happier.
Sharing (or Not) Parental Leave
If  the sharing of domestic work is one of the most disputed issues, the shar-
ing of parental leave seems ‘untroubled’. Before illustrating the narratives on 
parental leave, it should be pointed out that in Italy the law (Law 53/2000) 
stipulates that working mothers and working fathers of a newborn child are 
individually entitled to 6 months (10 months in total for the couple) of paren-
tal leave until the child reaches the age of 8, but neither parent may take more 
than 6 months of such leave (if  the father takes at least 3 months, the couple 
is entitled to 11 months in total). however, the main shortcoming of this 
measure, as mentioned above, is the low pay rate (only 30%), and that tempo-
rary workers are only entitled to it for a limited extent. the available research 
shows that the take-up salary rate of males (fathers) is very low; hence the 
majority of the entitled mothers use it. Moreover, in Italy paternity leave 
(congedo di paternità) was introduced only in 2012 (i.e. after the interviews) 
and to a very limited extent in terms of days (only two days). the analysis 
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of the narratives on parental leave shows indeed that most of the couples did 
not actively negotiate over who should take it, since it was assumed that the 
mother would do so. In almost all the cases analysed the mother was the one 
who was planning, expecting and afterwards using it (Musumeci, Naldini, & 
Santero, 2014). For example, raniero’s narrative shows how disagreement on 
parental leave and desires during the negotiation processes might not result 
in fulfilling the shared desire. raniero was entitled to (optional) parental leave 
but he did not plan to take it because of the economic crisis of his firm. Work 
had the central role in his life, and especially at the time when the company 
was under strain because of the crisis; he was trying not to get a bad reputa-
tion and to appear a ‘trustworthy worker’ in order to avert the risk of dis-
missal and the negative economic consequences on his family. he said:
I’d like to take at least two weeks of leave after the child’s birth but I’m afraid I’ll ask for 
only one…. I don’t see another possibility, I can’t take too much advantage of my job 
given the economic situation. (raniero, mechanical designer, I wave)
Vorrei prendere almeno due settimane di ferie dopo il parto, ma temo che ne chiederò solo 
una…. Non vedo un’altra possibilità, non posso pretendere troppo dal mio lavoro dato il 
periodo economico. (raniero, disegnatore meccanico, I wave)
raniero’s intention not to take parental leave led to discussions with his 
wife, who at first would have preferred him to take at least a short period of 
parental leave given that she, as a temporary worker, was not entitled to it. 
however, after an initial disagreement, rachele understood and accepted her 
husband’s decision. She was aware that in Italy it is not ‘normal’ for raniero’s 
as in other workplaces for a father to take parental leave.
I think that taking a long period of parental leave would have created a lot of difficulties 
for him because he works in an environment where it is absolutely not normal for a man 
to take it. (rachele, temporary researcher, I wave)
prenderlo proprio per dei mesi in modo continuativo; penso che gli avrebbe creato molte 
difficoltà prenderlo perché lavora in un ambiente in cui non è assolutamente normale il 
fatto che l’uomo lo prenda. (rachele, ricercatrice precaria, I wave)
he planned to compensate by providing little care by doing a large part 
of the housework, especially if  rachele would breastfeed the baby, while she 
expected to change her working time (having more ‘defined’ working hours). 
after the birth of the child, rachele started to redefine her career prospects 
somewhat; before the pregnancy and also before the marriage, her work 
career was her first priority; after the baby she seemed much more orientated 
towards family and motherhood:
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Now I am more resigned, It will go as it should go. I give priority to my family, I want 
to have a baby and even more than one even if  this means sacrificing my work career. 
(rachele, temporary researcher, II wave)
adesso con il matrimonio e la gravidanza forse punto anche su altre cose, nel senso che 
sono un po’ rassegnata che andrà come deve andare però ci tengo anche a costruire fuori 
dal lavoro, ci tengo alla mia famiglia, ci tengo ad avere un bimbo e altri se ne verranno 
anche a costo di sacrificare la carriera lavorativa. (rachele, ricercatrice precaria, II wave)
raniero did not think that the child’s birth would affect his professional 
life, although he was sure that it would impact rachele’s career. after the 
baby’s birth, rachele maintained the same job; she took leave for a month 
and reduced her working hours for some months; she also declared that her 
income came down by about 30% during that period. raniero’s working con-
ditions did not change: in coherence with the childcare plans declared in the 
prenatal interviews, he continued to work after the baby’s birth and did not 
take parental leave.
More innovative gender practices are instead observed in the case of 
Carlotta and Carlo, an egalitarian couple with an alignment between atti-
tudes and behaviour as their attitudes were stronger than those of raniero 
and rachele. at the time of the first interview, before childbirth, Carlo was an 
assistant manager in a bank; Carlotta was a temporary university researcher 
in law. Carlotta was a very career-oriented mother-to-be who gained great 
gratification from her job and was waiting for a tenure track position at the 
university. Given the expectations and prospects of Carlotta’s career devel-
opment, she was already during the first wave actively looking for childcare 
services, which would enable her to remain attached to her job. Carlo was 
very much in agreement with Carlotta’s desire to invest in her career. hence, 
while awaiting the baby, they (in agreement) had already explored the options 
concerning ‘breastfeeding leave’ (working time reduction) and ‘parental leave’ 
for Carlo. however, Carlotta, as a lawyer, was much more dynamic and active 
in exploring whether her partner could use these policy options. She said: ‘I 
studied his contract … and found that he could take this ‘breastfeeding leave’. 
Carlotta succeeded in bringing about a change. after the child’s birth, Carlo 
took breastfeeding leave (reduction in working hours by two hours a day until 
the baby’s first birthday). as explained above, this strategy was strongly sug-
gested and actively pursued by Carlotta.
however, unexpected constraints emerged and their preferences were 
no longer attainable. at the time of the second interview, while Carlo had 
rescheduled his working time, Carlotta had lost her position at the univer-
sity. She continued to study for a public competition for the magistrature 
and collaborated once a week at a lawyer’s office. Carlo was even taking care 
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full-time of the baby every weekend while Carlotta was attending a training 
course. however, since the prospects of an academic career had faded away, 
Carlotta had to redefine her priorities. On the other hand, Carlo was removed 
from his assistant manager’s position (vice director) of the bank, although he 
did not perceive this as direct consequence of his decision on breastfeeding. 
In other words, even if  Carlotta’s desires and strategies took priority in the 
couple, they could not achieve the allocation preferred because she did not 
obtain the desired position.
5. CONCLUSIONS
this chapter adds interesting insights to the literature on the value–practice 
dissonance in the division of paid and unpaid work concerning parenthood 
by focussing on case studies in Italy when partners have discordant attitudes/
preferences. It brings out conditions of their disagreements and explicit nego-
tiation processes and practices that correspond more to his than her prefer-
ences and his than her constraints.
the quantitative (cross-section) data containing information on both part-
ners and their behaviours and attitudes show that, when measures of relative 
resources or time availability are introduced, male attitudes ‘win’ in affecting 
the division of unpaid work: when he has egalitarian gender role views, divi-
sions are also more egalitarian regardless of her views. In any case, control-
ling for attitudes and labour market positions, the strongest effect is exerted 
by education with no ‘winner’ between him and her: high education leads to 
less traditional gender divisions regardless of whether it is possessed by only 
him, only her or both. a slightly different pattern emerges for participation 
in paid work, which seems to be more driven by her than his attitudes and 
by her than his education. Moreover, while disagreements between partners 
seem not to affect the division of domestic and care work, they do affect the 
division of paid work: couples that explicitly disagree on the allocation of 
domestic work have higher female employment rates than those of non-con-
flicting couples. Finally, regression analyses on the correlates of conflicting 
or non-conflicting couples show that couples with discordant attitudes tend 
to disagree more than couples with concordant attitudes, but only when she 
is egalitarian and he is traditional (whereas when she is traditional and he is 
egalitarian, disagreement is not expressed), or when she has a higher occupa-
tional position than his position (so that, as maintained by bargaining theory, 
she also has greater bargaining power). Overall, these quantitative results 
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suggest that, in line with ‘doing gender theory’, ‘gender trumps money’, but 
also that ‘education trumps money’. the effect of education remains signif-
icant when controlling for other covariates because high education entails 
both an instrumental and a moral rationality: it is an instrumental means to 
achieve important current and future monetary labour market returns (not 
fully captured by the use of a classification of occupational class into only 
four macro-groups as done in this work); it is also a means to develop non-
traditional views on gender models as well as on motherhood and fatherhood 
models (not fully captured by the use of only three attitudinal items as done 
in this work).
the quantitative analyses also suggest that ‘doing gender’ is much stronger 
(and ‘undoing gender’ much more difficult) in the private compared with the 
public sphere: the division of domestic and care work seems more resist-
ant to change and more respondent to men’s attitudes than the division of 
paid work, an area in which women indeed have become more independent 
concerning their own work careers, as maintained by hakim and individua-
tion theories. Moreover, if  there is openly a ‘voice’ for change in the gender 
division of work, it comes mainly from women: men, even when they are 
egalitarian in their declared attitudes, do not push for a more equal division 
or for greater household and care participation. this is strongly consistent 
with the Italian institutional and cultural context. as argued by various stud-
ies (anderson & McGuire, 2010; Bridges & pascoe, 2014; england, 2010), 
definitions of femininity have increasingly included the traditional male traits 
linked with the labour market or public sphere, while definitions of masculin-
ity more problematically include traditional female traits linked with the pri-
vate caring sphere. In other words, if  a woman works as much as a man, she 
is still considered and perceives herself  ‘as a good woman’ (at least if  she does 
not give up family responsibilities), whereas if  a man tends to be strongly 
involved in care and domestic work, he becomes ‘mammo’ (like a mother) 
even if  his full participation in the labour market does not cease (Magaraggia, 
2013). as suggested by the hidden power theory, since these persistent asym-
metric definitions of gender roles and identities are embedded not only in 
micro-practices and discourses but also in macro-institutional and structural 
settings, characterized, for example, by the absence of paternity leave or fully 
paid parental leave or widespread childcare services, they are probably more 
subtle and ‘unconsciously interiorised’ than declared so that asymmetric divi-
sions within marriage are taken for granted.
By interviewing men and women in partnership before and after the birth 
of their first child and by asking not only about their normative views but 
also their preferences (i.e. not only what people should do and be but also 
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what they would like to do and be) and the process behind observed prac-
tices, the qualitative longitudinal study has enriched the picture furnished by 
quantitative research. In line with the hidden power theory, this study con-
firms that very few couples during transition to parenthood overtly disagree. 
among those couples in which disagreement emerged, the main issue was 
the allocation of domestic work, with the ‘leading’ role of women in voicing 
and finding solutions. the couples’ narratives indeed indicated that negotia-
tion processes are always activated by the female partner and that they tend 
to be sensitive to life-course events (to cope with the newborn baby’s care 
demands). they also reveal a strong emotional work involved in such nego-
tiation and the difficulty of changing the gender division so that the main 
strategy to reduce disputes and conflicts is to externalize work by hiring a 
domestic helper for some hours a week.
a different pattern emerges concerning the division of parental leave, which 
seems even less discussed compared with the division of domestic work, and 
it is taken for granted that the mother will take such leave. Yet, negotiations 
on parental leaves seem to succeed more by men’s greater involvement com-
pared with those on domestic work. Before and after childbirth, compared 
with women, as for the division of domestic work is concerned in the cou-
ple who actively ‘demand’ negotiation on a more equal sharing, but unlike 
for domestic work, men are more responsive and willing to assume a greater 
workload, suggesting, as argued by Fuochi, Mencarini, and Solera (2014), 
that the models of fatherhood and the definitions of what is good for the 
child (having a father who looks after him/her) have changed more than gen-
der models. although care sharing is more negotiable and changeable than 
domestic sharing, the driving factors behind it are still strongly gendered: in 
couples’ narratives, labour-market conditions, such as long working hours or 
risk of penalties if  leave is taken, are mentioned as the constraining choices. 
Yet, these weigh much more in the case of men than for women and are justi-
fied through a redefinition of women’s work preferences for the best of the 
child and the family, reinforcing traditional divisions.
NOTES
1. the ‘Family and Social Issues’ survey is part of the multi-scope household sur-
vey cycle conducted by IStat and has been conducted every five years since 1998 on 
a sample of about 24,000 families (for a total of about 50,000 individuals) distributed 
in 809 Italian municipalities of different demographic sizes. Since, as underlined in 
the previous section, the link among attitudes, agreements and disagreements between 
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partners and gender practices is context-embedded, the Italian context shows a par-
ticularly strong institutional and cultural ‘inertia’. hence, we think that the time gap 
between the quantitative and qualitative data used in this chapter is not problematic. 
It is indeed reasonable to assume that processes, behaviours and accounts of couples 
with young children have not markedly changed in a 10-year period, for example, 
between 2003 and 2010, when the quantitative and qualitative interviews were con-
ducted respectively.
2. the classes were derived from the variable in the 15-category questionnaire that 
determined the types of occupational position declared, which, following Schizzerotto 
(2002), were grouped into four macro-classes: bourgeoisie, white-collar middle class, 
petty bourgeoisie and working class. then, as in Bernardi and Nazio (2005), these 
classes were hierarchically ordered and used as proxies for individual resources. 
Combining the job positions of him and her (in three cases: same class, man in supe-
rior class and woman in superior class), we obtained an indicator of relative resources 
to test the bargaining theory. this was obviously a very weak indicator, but, in the 
absence of variables on wages or greater details on job position from which to derive 
at least a scale of occupational prestige (e.g. the De Lillo and Schizzerotto scale or 
the hope–Goldthorpe scale), this seemed to be the best measure of relative resources 
available.
3. extra calculations are not shown in the tables.
4. xxxxx.
5. this qualitative study is part of an international project entitled ‘transparent’. 
http://www.transparent-project.com/info.html. For a full description of the Italian 
sample, see Naldini (2015).
6. these are invented names.
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